Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation
Monitoring and enforcement issues must be analyzed when determining the effectiveness of pollution control regulation. This book demonstrates how an economic analysis of law enforcement can generate important insights into how best to enforce pollution control regulation. It provides a clear and accessible way into the law and economics literature on enforcement. More specifically, the book uses U.S. economist and Nobel laureate Gary Becker's deterrence model which, by differentiating between two enforcement variables (namely the probability of apprehension and conviction and the severity of sanction), facilitates a comparison of the effectiveness of different enforcement tools in inducing desirable behavior. As such, it provides a valuable analytical tool in considering how best to pursue cost-effective enforcement. Major themes to be addressed include Becker's deterrence model and expansions thereof, reasons for compliance, environmental enforcement strategies, the importance of a deterrence threat, and formal pollution control law enforcement mechanisms (such as prosecution and criminal sanctions, administrative mechanisms, and civil liability). The book argues that, in pursuing cost-effective enforcement, much can be learned from examining enforcement practices in different jurisdictions. To this end, the author examines pollution control laws, enforcement strategies, and sanctions in Australia, Canada, England, and Wales. The book makes an important contribution to existing literature on environmental law enforcement, but its value extends beyond this. The theoretical framework adopted, and the range of issues discussed, will make it of interest to environmental lawyers and policy makers.
Publication Date: 5/18/2009